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Abstract 
Ethiopia decentralized its centralized unitary government system in 1991. This decentralization reform 
accompanied continuous restructuring of regional ethnic-based States and sub-national governments with the 
objective of establishing self-governing and empowered States for effective decentralized public governance in 
the country. However, some empirical studies criticized the policy stating that the objectives have not yet been 
achieved. The critics point out that the system lacks proper design to ensure accountability and structure that 
recognizes the population size for services provided. This article assesses the decentralized public governance 
system focusing on the features and challenges in order to improve public service provision in Ethiopia, in the 
context of Guraghe Zone Districts. To achieve the objectives of the study, the researcher employed concurrent 
mixed methodes research design. The data were collected through survey questionnaires,focus group discussions 
and key informant interviews, simultaneosly. The data were integrated for analyses and interpretation of the 
results. The researcher employs percentages, graphs, Chi-square and Kruskal Wallis Test to discuss and analyze 
the data, and identifies the institutional factors affecting the success of decentralized public governance for 
improved services. The results show that the majority of respondents agree that the decentralization system was 
well designed, while a significant number of respondents confirmed that decentralization reform has not been 
properly implemented. Furthermore, it was found that Zonal and Woreda administrators were not appropriately 
empowered, though this charge is enshrined in the Regional State Constitution. Through careful analyses of the 
data, the study identifies specific gaps in the system that leaders can then use to take corrective measures.  
Keywords: decentralized public governance, proper local government size, empowerment 
 
1. Introduction 
In 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) took power from the Communist-
Military Government of Ethiopia – The Derg. The EPRDF transitional government charter proclaimed ambitious 
new governing principles ‘equal rights and self-determination of peoples’ and affirmed “the right of nations, 
nationalities, and peoples to self-determination.”  Nine ethnic-based Regional State Governments were 
established to administer their own affairs within their own defined territory and to participate effectively with 
the central government on the basis of free, fair and proper representation”. 
Ethiopia’s government reform affected government structure, governance, capacity and interrelation 
between the Federal Government, Regional States and Local Governments during the last two decades. The 
government conceived decentralization as a strategy to empower grassroots governance, mobilize and utilize 
potential resources, address local issues for deepening democratic decentralization, and to transform institutions 
for economic development and poverty reduction (Tsegaye, 2006; World Bank, 2013).Though the government 
devolved power to local authorities, the system is deemed not responsive to local preferences or accountable to 
ordinary citizens. Instead, the system appears to have been used as a control mechanism for the central 
government (Merara, 2007; Zemelak, 2011). 
The change in local government design and structure, democratic governance, capacity and the 
interrelation between these variables has affected the allocation of resources and formulation of strategies to 
achieve the decentralization objectives (Zemelak, 2011; Tsegaye, 2006). However, the effects of the change in 
those plans and strategies are not as effective as how they have been designed and implemented at each level. 
The job description for each governance actor at each tier and how they interact with each other to mobilize and 
utilize public resources to execute plans affect the effectiveness of decentralized public governance. If there is 
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mismatch in personal responsibility and resource management, it can be destructive to the entire government’s 
ability to implement the strategy.     
Since the 1990s, decentralization and governance reform in Ethiopia have centered on changing 
political, administrative and fiscal systems. The reform aims to empower local authorities and communities, 
institutionalize decision-making process at the grassroots level, with the view to enhance local participation, 
promote good governance, and improve decentralized service provision (Lissane and Mohammed 2005 and 
CIDA 2005 cited in Meheret 2007). The central theme of the reform was to change government structure 
through legal frameworks. First, it intends to share authority between Federal, Regional State and Local 
Governments for improved public decision-making. Second, it attempts to institutionalize and strengthen the 
degree of horizontal coordination at each tier of government- that is, how far government ‘executives are able to 
work as a team’ by ensuring that all government institutions integrate in the same direction (Chema and Rondilli, 
2007; Manor, 2011; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). However, the traditional centralized system of control of local 
authorities by the higher government bodies remains unchanged (Zemelak, 2011). District Level 
Decentralization Program (DLDP), enacted in2002, was considered dynamic change since it featured political, 
administrative and fiscal changes at a national level. Nevertheless, improvement at the basic grassroots level is 
still a topic of discussion. 
Moreover, these efforts have been contested due to different horizontal and vertical political, 
administrative, and fiscal imbalances and differing institutional capacities (political, fiscal and administrative) 
between tiers of government (Zemelak, 2011; Merara, 2007). For example, decentralization design would lead to 
vertical fiscal imbalances in favor of the federal government because tax revenue sources have not decentralized 
as expenditure responsibilities have. Moreover, local government jurisdictions were not properly organized or 
structured for they do not consider the size of the local population in determining the size of government. The lack 
of nationally set standards to determine proper government size and structure has caused concern. This problem 
apparently opens the door for local privileged group patronages to manipulate the system in terms of ensuring 
private interests rather than public interests.  
Government institutions in national, regional and intermediate levels face significant decentralization 
policy challenges with the implementation of the reform. One of these challenges is lack of clear guidance for 
local government population size in either the constitution or decentralization documents. These pressures 
influence the effectiveness of the decentralization process to improve public services. This is particularly 
significant when investigating effectiveness of decentralized public governance for improved basic public 
service provision. The change aims to enhance effectiveness and efficiency of traditional and hierarchical public 
service organizations. While some scholars, quoting the local government problem that decentralization has 
experienced, assert that it is indeed rhetoric than practiced (Merara, 2007). Other scholars proclaim that 
decentralization has produced mixed results (Meheret, 2007). Some have argued that the new governance 
mechanism has complemented the continual reform being made, but there have been some setbacks, especially 
in its application of empowering the local government. Moreover, given the challenges of collective action in 
public resource management (IGR, 2008), public offices need to be flexible enough to be effective. The study 
intends to identify the influencing factors affecting effectiveness of decentralized public governance reforms, 
particularly decentralization reform implementation for improved services.    
More research on Ethiopian decentralized governance reform needs to be done. New directions for 
improved implementation are needed. Local social cohesion issues must be given considerable attention to make 
the changes introduced meaningful.This article investigates the decentralization reform design and its operation 
with reference to its effectiveness. It examines impact of the reform in effectiveness of decentralized public 
governance for improved public service provision in Guraghe Zone, Ethiopia - focusing on effects of the District 
level decentralization program since 2002.  
 
2. Problem Statement  
The problem this article attempts to address focuses on the lack of bringing effective decentralized public 
governance due to hindrances to improve services in Guraghe Zone Woredas (Districts).Although local 
governments in Ethiopia benefit from some level of constitutional privileges, the lack of clearly specified 
empowerment mechanism for local government units and ordinary citizens has caused them to concede their 
independence to Regional State Governments rendered useless the promise of forming autonomous local 
governance units. Decentralized public governance system can help address the call for improved local basic 
public services, production and provision. To realize this, however, it would take effective decentralized public 
governance that focuses on multiple stakeholders’ involvement in decision-making and implementation 
(Osborne, 2010). However, the prevailing decentralization design and its practices have clearly influenced its 
effectiveness (World Bank, 2013).Here, we define effective decentralized governance as a coordinated 
mobilization and utilization of resources, ideas, and energies that contribute to the solution of policy problems or 
the provision of new opportunities (Torfing,et al., 2012). 
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Ethiopia’s district level decentralization has promised better governance and deeper democracy. 
However, in practice, different factors have affected its results. Despite the recognized importance of DLDP for 
effective decentralized governance to improve public service provision, empirical studies are lacking on 
programs for properly structuring local government units, decentralization policy design and implementation, 
local government accountability mechanisms, empowerment and community participation, and local capacity in 
public decision making and implementation (Tegegne, 2007). Thus, this article examines issues related to 
decentralization policy design and implementation, local governance and the challenges of decentralized public 
governance in Guraghe Zone and its Districts.  
 
3. Population Size and Distribution of Guraghe Zone 
According to central statistical Agency (2007), the total population of Guraghe Zone is 1,280,484. It contains 8.5 
percent of the Southern Regional population (i.e., 15,042,531). Guraghe Zone stands in fourthposition in 
SNNPRS in terms of zonal population next to Sidama,GamoGoffa and Wolayta Zones, respectively (Guraghe 
Zone Urban Development Department, 2010). From the total population of the study area, the number of males 
is 622,254 and female 658,229. The percentage share of female population in the zone is 51.5% whereas the 
males constitute 48.5 % of the total population. The lower male count is explained by the fact that most of the 
males from Guraghe zone live out of the zone, mainly for commercial purpose. As a result, male deficit 
population characterizes the zone. The disparities repeat again at the Woreda levels, due to same reason.  
Districts in zones, in small selection of cases, are given large number of local government systems across 
Ethiopia. This arrangement limits discussions in linguistically or dialectically diverse ethnic groups in Ethiopia. 
The reason for this is that zones (Ethnic Groups) serve units of analysis. The country is clearly defined in the 
south semantic languages, and local governments are amalgamated and fragmented since 1991. Guraghe Zone 
districts/ethnic groups share a culture and artistic heritage; they have similar political ideals and have 
experienced the parallel development of forms of religion; and many have had similar patterns of economic 
development. The organization and structure of Guraghe Zone was an entity different prior to1991. Before the 
downfall of the Military totalitarian socialist government, parts of Guraghe Zone administration had been 
structured in different territorial authorities such as the Haykochena Butajira, ChebonaGuraghe, and 
KembatanaHadiyaAwerajas.   
It shows that the zone had not been self-governed locality of Ethiopia. As the other ethnic groups of the 
country, the Guraghe ethnic group’s clans and sub-clans were struggling for self-rule and consolidation. 
Nowhere is a unique Guraghe Zone with a common identity belonging to Guraghe.  Alongside these ethnic and 
community legacies are shared cultural and indigenous knowledge that have defined the Guraghe space at 
various points in time and have collectively been protected from fragmentation and maintained their unity 
(Guraghelema, 2011). Note that privileged local elites should remember the diversity both across and within the 
Guraghe ethnic group and the constant socioeconomic development, particularly variations between western and 
Eastern Guraghe.  However, there is sufficient common legacy to take the local government systems and their 
contexts together, especially when the 1995 Ethiopia’s Constitution strengthens the self-governance (Tsegaye, 
2006). As, formation of Districts is based on their clan and sub-clans, they vary in their population size. Figure 1 
clearly shows the variation between Districts in Guraghe Zone. 
 
 
Figure 1: Population size and distribution of Guraghe Zone and its districts, 2007 G.C 
Source: drawn from Central Statistical Agency data, 2008 
Note: Butajira and Wolkite are urban town administrations  
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The rapid population growth in Guraghe Zone Woredas and inadequate growth of public service 
facilities create a huge demand for and produce pressure on public institutions (Guraghelima, 2011). The 
mismatch between demand and supply of services has become a debatable issue in local areas (ibid).The formal 
public service system provides only limited services, which are highly inaccessible to the poor. Based on the 
available evidence, decentralized service provision in Ethiopia in general and Guraghe Zone Woredas in 
particular has brought changes in basic public services such as education, health, water supply and transportation. 
 
Figure 2: Administrative Map of Guraghe Zone 
Source: Guraghe Zone Urban Development Department, 2010 
 
4. Research Methodology 
This article is based on data collected in asocial survey study undertaken in Guraghe Zone Districts, Ethiopia in 
2013/14. The Guraghe Zone’s districts are purposively sampled to identify challenges and prospects of 
decentralized public governance for self-governance in the study area. Qualitative and quantitative data were 
collected from both primary and secondary sources through surveys, FGDs, interviews, content analysis of relevant 
documents, including FDRE Constitution and 2001 revised South Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional 
State (SNNPRS) Constitution. The data are presented anonymously, in line with the ethical agreement between 
the researcher and participants. These data were integrated for the purpose of analysis and interpretation.  
Concurrent mixed methods approach is selected in order to strengthen salience of the conclusion and final 
recommendations (Creswell 2003). 
 
5. Literature Review 
5.1. Overview decentralization, Local government and governance in Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is one of the oldest countries in the world. It had a decentralized governance system until 1885(Merara, 
2007, Zemelak, 2011). The features of the old system were distinguished by the existence of autonomous kings, 
provincial, and local nobilities with powers to exercise self-rule in their respective locality (Assefa, 2007). 
Ethiopia was known for authoritarian centralized governments throughout its long history (1855-1974).Emperor 
Haile Selassie I, proclaimed the first written Ethiopian Constitution as a formal mechanism to centralize power 
(ibid). This constitution gave absolute centralized power for the Emperor over provincial and local governments 
while it ended the autonomy of local governors throughout the country (Zemelak, 2011). The introduction of a 
‘uniform local administrative system’ in Ethiopia was relegated to the Emperor. The central unitary government 
of the then Ethiopia was structured into a three-tiered sub-national government system dubbed provinces, 
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awrajas, and Woredas. 
The theoretical literature on decentralization in developing countries show that it has led to significant 
improvements in local governance and public service provision(PSP) for many people in different parts of the 
world (Manor, 2011). These have been achieved through combination of different mechanisms such as 
strengthening governance principles(participation, responsiveness, transparency, accountability), reducing 
corruption, and improving cost recovery; improving power relations; promoting efficiency and effectiveness of 
PSPs; and empowering community and enhancing its participation in the development (World Bank, 2003; 
Kimenyi and Meagher, 2004,). However, the literature does not show decentralization in all its manifestations to 
be universally beneficial.  Furthermore, there are little empirical literature to verify whether or not this is true 
(Conyers, 2007). The difficulties or failures of decentralization are related to benefits of local elites capture, 
exclusion of poor and marginalizing groups from participation, and fragmentation of the states (Oluwu and 
Wusch, 2004,World Bank, 2010). These arguments against decentralization fall into national and grassroots 
impact. Firstly, the local governments overuse power beyond their assigned functions.  
This can lead to conflicts between tiers of government in exercising authority as well as resource use 
(Oluwu and Wusch, 2004). This may result in situations where in some cases local governments may engage in 
policymaking in the areas beyond their jurisdiction. This could lead to overlapping and duplication of 
government activities. The second argument against decentralization concerns the possibility that the elite and 
privileged may usurp local government power (Kimenyi and Meagher, 2004). Thus, there are cases where 
decentralization creates coordination problems for decision-making across different communities, exacerbate 
incentives for officials to predate, and generate barriers to any attempt to alter the status quo (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2006). The decentralization of power to territorially concentrated ethnic groups might provide a 
base for secession, or further fragmentation into clan-based States or local fiefdoms(Tsegaye, 2006).In fact, 
Zoescott(2009) also ascertained that decentralization endangered unity of some States and ethnic groups. The 
numbers of Woredas in Guraghe Zone in particular and Ethiopia in general have been steadily increasing over 
the years because of frequent splitting of existing Woredas to create the new ones. This invites more territorial 
fragmentation based on clan subdivisions. Such practices could weaken the contributions of social capital for 
local economic and social development in general, and PSP in particular which call for collective action. The 
proper size of local government can affect the economic efficiency of PSP, “especially where economics of scale 
and scope are significant factors in the cost of service delivery” (Dollery and Robotti, 2008, p.30).  
From the above cases, it can be argued that the failures of decentralization must arise either due to poor 
design of the reform or else has to be related to weak implementation. The decentralization reform framers claim 
the problems spring from local government authorities pointing to misuse of public resources, corruption and 
inefficiency there. In fact, it is public secret that there is much waste, corruption and inefficiencies. Empirical 
research on the Ethiopian decentralization reform seems to offer contradictory conclusions. As Meheret(2007) 
ascertained, decentralization in Ethiopia was established to legally authorize Woreda administrations. The 
regional governments recognize the powers of local governments in their regional constitutions as well. The 
constitutions clearly define the powers and functions of each tier of government. However, its implementation 
and practice have been challenged. In practice, powers designated to low level officials is often transferred to 
higher level ones where lower level offices are given limited managerial and technical authority, and often it is 
observed that local governments must subordinate themselves and authority to higher officials regarding 
decisions on political, administrative and fiscal matters (Meherete, 2007). As a result, some of the intended 
targets for better basic public services provision are missed (ibid).  
Tegegne (2007) confirms that perceived decentralization has helped in the mushrooming and 
strengthening of ethnic-based development associations in Ethiopia. On the other hand, decentralization has not 
led to a significant growth of formal and independent civic organizations at the grassroots level. Tsegaye(2006) 
indicated that the social cohesion and unity of Guraghe ethnic group in Ethiopia is weakened following the 
ethnic decentralization in Ethiopia. However, there is little empirical evidence focusing on challenges and 
features of decentralized public governance for improved public services provision. This study contributes some 
insights in filling such gaps.   
 
5.2. Public Management Reform 
 Over the last four decades, governments in developed and developing countries have been reformed their public 
sectors’ management and governance practices. This was also true for Ethiopia. International public management 
reforms have been implemented with deliberate design and process to transform the State (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2011).  The process, causes and effects of such reforms have shown variation based on the contexts. The most 
cited causes for these reforms are associated with failures in the traditional and bureaucratic governance and the 
desire to establish ‘self-governance’ through a decentralized system of government (Jorensen and Torfin, 2009). 
In 1970s, many developed countries reformed their governance and public administration to address 
‘governability crises’ of the time. The proponents of those reforms articulated the ills of governing by sheer 
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might and sole decision-making powers on public policy and implementation. However, the opponents highly 
criticized such change claiming that these moves encouraged fragmentation of the State. In the 1980s, in 
response to the aforementioned critics, the new governance network theorists proposed mechanisms for how to 
create relatively autonomous public institutions at central and local levels. They looked at a new model of public 
governance that needed to a decentralized plurality involving State, market and civil society (Jorensen and 
Torfin, 2009; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). The majority of public sector reforms including decentralization 
reform evolved with new organizational structures through redesigning their public services (Boyne, 2003). This 
has been changing modes of public governance through modification and/or transformation of bureaucratic 
hierarchy and market (Rhodes, 1997). This results in the establishment of horizontal reforms of intra-
organizational coordination and/or institutionalization of different forms of inter-organizational cooperation. 
Sorensen and Torfing(2008)have properly summarized five of the potential impacts of governance networks that 
impact the effectiveness of public governance: 
1. Strengthens knowledge sharing between actors for better political goals achievement; 
2. Improving coordination through the creation of a shared perception of the reform objectives and why 
they are significant; 
3. Raising the level of awareness of ownership of policy among the involved and affected areas, thus 
reducing resistance and paving the way for the smooth implementation of policy goals; 
4. Bridging differences that enhance the production of the new results; and 
Introducing good governance through workable institutions. 
 
5.3. Overview of Theoretical Framework  
The researcher employs public management reform models to develop the research framework. According to 
Pollitt and Bouckaert(2011), public management reform is deliberate change made to the structure and process 
of public sector organizations with the objective of getting them to run better for improving public services 
provision. This study on decentralization reform in Ethiopia falls under public management reform. 
Governments adopt institutional mechanisms for coordination of citizens to influence effectiveness of 
governance. Pollitt and Bouckaert discuss three general public management models that governments can adapt. 
1. New Public Management Model(NPM): This model claims that governments need to be more efficient, 
and consumer- responsive by injecting businesslike methods. Some of Ethiopia’s public sector 
reforms have been associated with NPM. 
2. Neo-Weberian State Model(NWS): NWS proposes modernizing traditional hierarchy of governments. 
The implication is that modernizing government would improve the hierarchy by making 
managers professional, efficient and responsive to citizens. It reflects a more optimistic and 
trusting attitudes towards government apparatus than NPM. This model seems more applicable in 
developing countries like Ethiopia. That is because the private sector organizations do not 
currently provide efficient services nor do they use business-like methods. 
3. Governance Network Theory(GNT): This theory focuses on making government better informed, more 
flexible and less exclusive by working through self-governance networks rather than hierarchies 
and/or market mechanisms. It utilizes network of independent stakeholders as a coordinating 
mechanism. 
4. New Public Governance Model(NPG): This model claims to make the government more effective, 
efficient and legitimate by including a wider range of governance actors in both public policy 
making and implementation(Osborne, 2010). Its features include some notions of NPM, but 
government functions are given more weight in making rules, procedures, regulations, resources, 
methods and culture. The basic coordination mechanism assumed in this model is exercised 
through the authority and disciplined hierarchy of impartial officials.  
By considering applicability of the different models for the analysis, the researcher employed a mixed 
approach of the aforementioned models. This approach is aligned with the Ethiopian government choice to adapt 
mixed approaches for the implementation of its governance reforms in the context. 
 
6. Analytical Framework 
After careful review of the related literature on decentralization and decentralized public governance, and 
theoretical frameworks, the following analytical framework has been constructed. The analytical framework 
depicts the local government challenges related to reform design, structure, processes and governance that are 
the likely to succeed. Many scholars argue that identifying and directly measuring effects in terms of   outputs 
and outcomes of government reforms in general and decentralization reform in particular is problematic (Pollit 
and Bouckaer, 2011). The analytical framework focuses on the research questions that were drawn from the 
problem statement of the study.   
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7. Results and Discussion 
The assessment of the effectiveness of decentralization policy in Ethiopia was undertaken based on how well the 
process was designed and implemented for effective decentralized public governance. The assessment and 
discussion of the findings were based on primary and secondary data collected from Guraghe Zone and its 
districts. The study attempts to identify the challenges and features that local public administrators and other 
governance actors have experienced in working effectively: the general recurrent institutional constrains of the 
local public administrations, the interference of upper level governments through appointed members, the control 
of local bodies by higher government tiers and their impact on local affairs, the inadequate organization and 
restructuring of local governments for improved services provision, issues related to local government and 
community empowerment, the level of community participation and other local governance related issues were 
assessed in depth. 
 
7.1. Relevant Features and Challenges of Decentralized Public Governance in Ethiopia  
Since 1974, under the Socialist Military Regime, the political and economic decision-making powers were 
concentrated at the center. Many scholars claim this over-centralized system as one of the reasons for public 
sector governance inefficiency and ineffectiveness in public services and citizens’ living under poverty 
(Dickovick and Tegegne, 2010). Under EPRDF, in order to address the failures as well as the challenges of 
decentralized public governance, the government has put forward different development plans, policies, 
strategies and programs to achieve its vision of a ‘middle income country’ by 2020(UN, 2007).  
Since 2001, the Ethiopian government’s medium term national development frameworks (PRSP, 
PASDEP and GTP) emphasized the need for decentralized decision-making and implementation for better PSPs. 
To address the present day governance and socioeconomic development problems, the current government 
introduced District Level Decentralization Program (DLDP)in 2001/02.  
Decentralization is the transfer of power and resources from the central government to its subnational 
government units for effective decentralized public governance. Its success requires institutional mechanisms for 
communication and collaboration between levels of government and other actors (Meekiso 2007). There is no 
best system that fits all; however, each can devise its own mechanisms and institutions for coordinating the 
activities and policies at different levels (ibid). These institutional mechanisms can facilitate governance actors’ 
interactions in terms of the level of political influence on the allocation of resources, the level of mutual 
understanding between different tiers of government in decision-making, the degree of autonomy, existence of 
clearly defined powers and functions, and the extent of resource decentralization. 
The Federal Government of Ethiopia empowers Regional State governments to organize local 
administrative units, and determine powers, functions and procedures of local governments at Zonal, District 
and Keble levels (1995 FDRE Constitution article50(4)).It devolves adequate powers to the lowest units of 
government thus enabling the people to participate directly in the administration of the aforementioned local 
units. This reveals the political will of the national government at least of its constitution. However, true 
decentralization of power, of course, depends on the process established and what is practiced on the ground. 
The design of devolving government functions from central government to local governments requires 
political, administrative, and fiscal considerations (World Bank, 2010). The design of the government has been 
bringing good governance at all levels through transfer of power and resources from central government to local 
governments to improve decentralized public services (Dickovick, and Tegegne, 2010).  
The process and structure of local governments is associated with changes in political, administrative, 
cultural, legal, fiscal and economic power/function. The success of public sector reforms in general and 
decentralization reform in particular, have determined how constructs match the aforementioned factors. 
Devolving political decision-making without empowering local communities, or decentralizing resources 
without adequate accountability through political decentralization, invites problems such as corruption (Tsegaye, 
2006). 
National and Regional State constitutions were reviewed with the aim to decipher the challenges and 
features of decentralization policy design. In addition, survey participants were asked related question and 
regarding their perception on the challenges and features of Guraghe Zone and its districts, as shown in Table 2. 
     
7.2. Decentralization Policy Design and Its Implementation in Ethiopia  
Survey respondents were asked whether decentralization in Ethiopia was designed well and implemented as 
designed. As depicted in the Table 2, (65.4%) confirmed decentralization in Ethiopia was well designed; while a 
significant number of the participants (53.4%) reported that it has not been implemented well as designed. This 
shows that one of the gaps for achieving effective decentralized public governance is related to implementation 
gap. The FGDs participants also support the existence of implementation gap as the most important challenge for 
decentralization success. 
The district level decentralization program promises autonomy (self-rule) at the district and Kebel 
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levels. However, in the Ethiopian prevailing situation shows that there is inequitable distribution of power and 
resources under the control of the central government (Zemelak, 2011; Merara, 2007). The gap exists between 
decentralization program design and its implementation. The root cause for this failure is the contradictory action 
of the ethnic-based Ethiopian federal and decentralized system on paper and centralization in practice (Merara, 
2007, Zemelak, 2011).In the review of the1995 FDRE and the revised 2001South Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS) Constitution, data gathered from survey participants confirmed that the regional 
self-government and local self-governments were established through a series of government proclamations. For 
example, the 1991Ethiopian transitional government charter in article 15(b) of proclamation 7/1992empowered 
the Regional States to establish additional administrative units to enable the people to directly participate in the 
administration of such units at the district levels, taking into account the area and population of the respective 
regions. Later on, the 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia(FDRE) article 50(4) 
devolves adequate powers to the lowest unit of government to enable the people to participate directly in the 
administration of local units of government. Moreover, district level decentralization program devolved power to 
Woreda administration and Kebel administration levels since 2001/02. It aims to take away local public 
decision-making power from Federal and Regional State governments to Zonal, Woreda and Kebel levels. 
However, about 65% of the survey respondents in this study said they were dissatisfied with their participation in 
local public decision-making processes.  
The Regional States are empowered constitutionally on determining lower level administrative 
structures. However, the SNNPRS Constitution does not provide parallel empowerments for Zonal government 
to determine administrative units’ structure below it (Woreda and Kebel units). Over 51% of respondents in this 
survey confrim that decision making authority is centralized (see table2).  This arrangement denies local 
governments to enjoy their constitutional autonomy. Local public officials interviewed in this study also 
confirmed that they do not have the autonomy the constitution guaranteed them. .The interviewed official 
claimed that this SNNPRS recentralization of decision-making power hinders local government empowerments.  
 
Table 2: Perception on Relevant Local Government Features and Recurrent Problems 
Challenges and Features for Effective Decentralized Governance  
 
Responses in % 
Yes  NO  IDK  
Decentralization reform was  designed well  65.4  27.5  7.3  
Decentralization reform  was implemented well  39.3  53.4  7.3  
Defined roles and responsibilities at each level  74.4  18.7  6.5  
Government procedures and institutions have been implemented as designed  30.2  62.2  7.6  
Executives have not been committed for reform implementation  60.3  33.2  6.5  
Higher level governments interference  exists 63.3  19.8  14.9  
Existence of higher level political patronage  &interference on local affairs  48.1  22.2  29.8  
Centralization of decision-making  authority  51.1  40.9  8.8  
Mismatch between resources and mandates  54.9  26  19.1  
Low level of local government capacity  54.9  18.7  26.1  
Lack of proper local government organization and structure policy  66.8  29.8 3.4  
Inappropriate local government population size 43.9  53.1  2.3  
IDK= I Don’t Know 
Source: Researcher’s Ph.D. Field Survey, 2013/14 
 
7.3. Institutional Arrangements of Local Government Accountability 
Inappropriate institutional arrangement for local government accountability in a decentralized system of 
governance is an emerging challenge for local governments in developing countries including Ethiopia (World 
Bank, 2010). Guraghe Zone is one of the administrative hierarchies within SNNPR State. The zonal council is 
the highest authority elected every five years and appoints the chief administrator from the Regional State and 
the Zonal elected council members from the Zone. In this regard, study participants interviewed disclosed that 
the logic of organizing zonal council membership to include Regional State council members amounts to power 
grab by Regional State authorities. Furthermore, the zonal chief administrator is accountable to the zonal council, 
and the Regional State Chief executive (2001 Revised SNNPR State constitution article 87(2)).This reveals that 
the institutional design for accountability of zonal chief administrators refer to a design that   effectively   forced 
the   chief administrator to   act   as   agent of the Regional State government, while he or she is elected 
representative of the people in the zone level. This hampers free deliberations at the zonal council. As argued by 
some FGDs participants, if a zonal chief administrator were to challenge a Regional State government order, he or 
she would be dismissed. The implication is that democratic governance at sub-national levels is highly influenced 
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by a controlling apparatus of the SNNPRS’s order (Zemelak, 2011, Merara, 2007). Majority of the survey 
participants (63.3%) confirmed that high level government interference is a major challenge for local governance. 
Furthermore, as some key interview informants of local chief administrators argued, that local actors lack 
autonomous decision-making power. They stated that centralized EPRDF party line command and control 
mechanisms significantly reduce the freedom of local chief administrators and public officials from self-
governance (Meheret, 2007; Zemelak, 2011). Survey participants criticized the double role and influence of 
Regional State council members. Similarly, they claimed that zonal council members indirectly influence the 
district council decision-making process. Participants argue that this approach imposes significant challenges to 
decentralized public governance. In all sampled districts, State government has used its discretion to determine 
local government and their public sector organizational structures.  
The local council can call and investigate the chief administrator and other officials to conduct and 
discharge of its responsibilities (2001 revised SNNPRS Constitution article 81(3h)). The Constitution does not 
explain how each member of the local council represents the people of the locality as a whole. Moreover, it does 
not state how they are accountable to the constitution, the will of the people and their conscience. The 
accountability of the local government is also forcefully connected to the Regional State government. These 
measures show how SNNPRS strongly controls local governments even more than the central government when 
it comes to local independence, self- governance, and accountability. 
 
7.4. Assignment of Functions and Resources for Tiers of Government 
The participants’ perception on clear definition of roles and functions of each tier of governments vary. Such 
lack of clarity on roles and functions may lead to unnecessary interferences on decisions impacting sub-national 
governments. The majority of survey participants (65.3%) reported that they have observed interferences on tiers 
of governments. The data revealed that sub-national governments would take measures that are outside of their 
assigned authority. The existence of interference shows that there are conflicts of interests among different levels 
of actors (citizens, sub-national government bodies, service providers etc). FGD participants pointed out that 
conflict of interest exists due to lack of clear definition of roles and responsibilities significantly affecting 
decentralized public services provision. Ironically, as shown in Table 2, a significant number of survey 
respondents (74.4%), reported that roles and responsibilities of governments at each level are clearly defined. 
The local council is formed in order to challenge the power of the local administrative executive and 
judiciary branch, and provide a strong popular power base. In addition, DLDP aimed to increase the decision-
making power of the local citizen particularly the disadvantaged by devolving implementation of government 
programs to the zonal, district and Kebel administrations (PSCAP Report, 2008). FGDs participants point to a 
critical concern regarding the personal capacity of elected officials to act in their role as representatives. They 
are observed to be quite passive in their role with little participation in discussions and approvals. They fail to 
review, formulate, implement and monitor critical and impactful plans. As a result, the checks and balances 
presumably built into the constitution to avoid redundancies and corruption become moot. In other words, the 
accountability of local administrative executives to local elected representatives is not promising.   
As of the data presented in Table 2 above indicates, the majority of the survey respondents (54.9%) 
asserted that the level of local government capacity is low. Comparatively, as zonal council member of FGD 
participants argued, the capacity of council members is far lower than that of executives.  As most FGDs 
participants revealed, the local governance actors are unable to take advantage of the constitutional provision in 
their context. As mentioned by the civil servants at FGD, the upper level political elites and their local patrons 
benefited more than the poor and excluded groups are at the grassroots of the study area.Majority of survey 
respondents (63.3%) observed that officials at different tiers of government exercise authority outside of what 
the constitution allows.  
Table 3: Kruskal Wallis Test for the Existence of Interference between Tiers of Government 
 Local 
Administration 
n Mean Rank  Test Statistics
a,b 
 
 Have you ever 
observed any tier of 
government take 
measures outside of 
their assigned function? 
Guraghe Zone 22 99.27 Chi-Square 10.396 
Wolkite 22 109.82 df 7 
Abesheghe 27 98.46 Asymp.Sig.    0.167 
Enmor-Ener 47 107.18 a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Local 
Administration 
Endegagn 20 115.15 
Geta 22 115.95 
Ezza 30 121.90 
Sodo 36 134.56 
Total 226  
Source: Researcher’s Ph.D. Field Survey, 2013/14 
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The study data analyzed and the Kruskal Wallis H Test presented in Table 3 show that the significance 
level is 0.167 and is greater than 0.05. Therefore, the finding reveals that   there is no statistically significant 
difference in perceptions of survey participants across the local government institutions’ for the existence of 
interference. Table 3 also shows that the survey confirmed that there is interference between tiers of government 
and that officials exercise authority outside of their jurisdiction 
Findings of the study show that SNNPR regional State has not empowered its lower administrative 
structure (Zonal authority) to take similar action in its lower administration structure (Woreda). Local 
governments need empower themselves as guaranteed by the constitution such that they will not be controlled and 
commanded by unnecessary Regional State government discretionary power. As argued by local government 
officials, many Regional State officials and politicians have been distrustful of local government empowerment 
as a potential danger to their own authority and have perceived such a move as potential threat to their own 
power base. Though they fail to practice it, Regional State politicians are not constitutionally permitted to 
organize government structures at will, dolling out powers to themselves and others under them.  
 
7.5. Local Government Formation in Ethiopia 
The factors following the ethnic-based local government restructuring are complex. The basis for the new 
initiatives in DLDP has been associated with the need for efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and 
accountability of institutional actors (PSCAP Report, 2008). As shown in Table 4, majority of survey 
participants (62.2% for Kebel administration and 66.4% for Woreda administration) remarked that the 
government structure policy is unclear and inadequate to determine the size of local government administration 
units.   
 
Table 4: Is the existing government structure policy clear and suitable to determine the size of local 
administration for efficient, fair and effective services provision to the residents/citizens? 
The existing government structure policy is clear and suitable to Y N IDK 
n % n % n % 
Size of Kebel administration 84 32.1 163 62.2 15 5.7 
Size of Woreda administration 79 30.2 174 66.4 9 3.4 
Note: Y= Yes, N= No, IDK= I Do not Know, n= Frequency 
Source: Researcher’s Ph.D. Field Survey, 2013/14 
Key informants pointed out that inadequate government structural policy on size of local governments 
hinders their ability to be effective and improve services. The FGDs participants claimed that the clan and sub-
clan driven districts have created a zonal unity without central core and brings its varied citizens to social 
cohesion. More recently, the effects of fragmentation in districts have made the structure wildly diverse, un-
welding and difficult to amalgamate. Such unintended consequences cause huge administrative challenges to 
reunify the fragmenting units. It creates structural instability on the existing system. In this manner, more and 
more the local government population and geographic areas have been reshaped in the last two decades. The 
implication is that such fragmentation alters both formal and informal institutions for citizen participation in local 
development of Guraghe group. Scholars have found that there is association between the ‘efficiency and 
effectiveness of public service provision and   the   size   of   local   government   units due to   economies   of   
scale’ (Sharpe cited in Peter, 2001). Policies should recognize that local government size impacts efficiency and 
effectiveness of workers. It is important that we find a balance between what scholars suggest and the need of 
politicians in determining the size of local governments.  
Ethiopia’s government reform is geared towards creating more new sub-national governments. This is 
so critical that the success of the reform might be measured by the multiplicity of sub-governmental units. 
Regional States are empowered constitutionally to determine lower level administrative structures. However, the 
Regional State Constitution does not provide parallel empowerment mechanism for Zonal government to 
determine administrative structures for units below it (Woreda and Kebel). Unfortunately, due to such 
restrictions, local government units cannot enjoy administrative autonomy. So confirm the interviewed local 
public officials.   
In Ethiopia, new forms of Ethnic-based Regional States and local governments have been established 
since 1991. The government structure changed from unitary to Federal form.  Nevertheless, in practice, the 
traditional bureaucratic hierarchical structures established for controlling and commanding of local governments 
have not been realized (Merara, 2007; Zemelake, 2011). In this regard, Guraghe Zone provides an attractive 
center for study of decentralized public governance change in structure. The FGDs results revealed that the Guraghe 
Zone and its districts have long been politically and socially instable because of emerging reunification and 
fragmentation of its groups since 1991.They have been governed by a new zonal and district government structures in 
which local public governance was politicized through local ethnic-based elite patrons networks and lack of separation 
of policy formulation and the administration of zone public service provision (Tsegaye, 2006). 
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A different unintended consequence has to do with the accountability of council members. There is no 
clear perception on whether they represent the people of their jurisdiction (clan or sub-clan)or the entire 
population in the Zone. According to the survey results, the fragmenting aspect claimed to weaken zonal social 
cohesion and reduce equality, unity and fraternity among Guraghe clans, sub-clans, and expansively all citizens. 
As depicted in Table 5, a significant number of survey respondents (51.9%) observed that participation at 
different levels of the Zone is not complementary but more of a substitution. This is one commonly witnessed 
consequence brought about by the decentralization reform. 
 
Table 5: Have you observed that acts of participation at different levels of the zone are not complements but 
substitutes? 
Responses Frequency Percent 
Yes 136 51.9 
no 113 43.1 
I do not Know 13 5.0 
Total 262 100.0 
Source: Researcher’s Ph.D. Field Survey, 2013/14 
The FGDs participants criticized the central government for not coordinating and monitoring how local 
elites and Regional State are implementing the structuring policies in general and decentralization reform in 
particular at the grass-roots level. In addition, one of the FGDs participants’ asserted that district level 
decentralization program implementation is ‘a trick for power and resources at sub-national government levels in 
the name of ordinary citizens’. This shows how participants are dissatisfied with how the reform is being 
practiced despite the central government proclamations. The determining factor that contributes to the failure of 
the decentralization reform is poor central government monitoring, coordination, and inadequate Regional State 
institutional arrangement for accountability. This has encouraged locals to establish patronage networks for 
misuse of power and public resources for personal use than for public interest. Therefore, proper scrutiny and 
commitment at both the Federal and Regional State government levels are essential for improved self-
governance.     
 
7.5.1. Local Government Population Size in Guraghe Zone Districts 
Prominent scholars state that proper population size and geographic area is mandatory for effective, efficient and 
responsive public services provision (Sharpe cited in Peter, 2001). The prevailing Woredas and Kebeles 
administrations’ population size do not reflect such perspective nor are they aligned with nationally established 
frameworks. As can be seen in Table 6, significant number of survey participants (43.9% for Woreda units) also 
revealed that the existing population density and geographic area of Woredas is not compatible with the national 
service delivery standards.. However, majority of the survey participants (72.1% for size of Kebel and 53.1% for 
size of Woreda units) confirmed that their local government units’ population size and geographic areas are 
compatible with the national services delivery standards and are proper for the services provision (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6: Are the existing local government units in your locality consisting of appropriate population density and 
geographical area compatible with the national service delivery standards in practice? 
Responses Kebeles Woreda 
n % n % 
0 2 .8 2 .8 
Yes 189 72.1 139 53.1 
No 62 23.7 115 43.9 
I do not know 9 3.4 6 2.3 
Total 262 100.0 262 100.0 
Source: Researcher’s Ph.D. Field Survey, 2013/14 
Figure 3 provides detailed information on variation in population size of district governments in 
Guraghe Zone. Though, Ethiopia’s district level decentralization program intended for district administration 
with an average population between 100,000 and 120,000 inhabitants for efficient and effective public services 
provision (Meheret, 2002 and World Bank, 2013), the population sizes of Guraghe Zone Districts vary from 
167,145 people in Ennemor and Enner District to 49,152 people in Endegagn District (as of fiscal year 2008). 
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Note: Wolkite and Butajira are towns  
Source: Drawn from Central Statistical Agency, 2008 data 
Even though, with natural population growth the prevailing demographic increase is fairly expected, as 
shown in Figure 3, Guraghe Zone districts population sizes do not meet the national standard for the status of a 
district. The data show that two of the districts (Ennemor and Enner, and Sodo) have inhabitants more than 
120,000. While the remaining eleven districts in the zone have less than 100,000 inhabitants. Thus, the 
population size of districts and Kebeles in Guraghe Zone do not satisfy the nationally accepted standards of DLDP 
and other proper legal frameworks. Moreover, the overall criteria for the formation of district and Kebel 
structures are complicated and not clear. In this regard, FGDs and key participants were asked, ‘what are the 
criteria for the new formation of local governments?’ The answer was that the likely criterion is clan and sub-
clan settlement based and/or is a political decision. From the aforementioned discussions, it is possible to see that 
the importance of proper local government population size and geographic area for effective, efficient and 
responsive public services provision were missing in Guraghe Zone Districts and Kebeles. 
 
7.5.2. The Implication of Local Population Size Variation on Effective Decentralized Public Governance 
Despite the variations in population size and geographic area, the organizational structure of local public sectors: 
education, health, agriculture, road and transport etc, has been the same for both large and small sized districts 
and Kebeles to provide services (Tsegaye, 2006). The frequent structural changes introduced have created 
instability in assignment of functions. Local governments with different population sizes are allocated the same 
number of organizations to serve them, as well as relatively the same number of local officials and service 
provider. This creates a situation where officials assigned at larger localities suffer bigger workload, while at the 
same time; customers also must endure longer waits due to insufficient number of case workers. For instance, 
during the research fieldwork, it was observed that each Kebel administration was assigned two health extension 
agents, without regard to variation in population size and geographic area of the unit. This arrangement creates 
unequal work-load for front line public service providers based on district of assignment. As if the workload 
issue is not enough, all service providers are paid equal salary. The local government bodies are unable to solve 
such structural problems because they are not empowered to do so. The authorities lack such discretionary 
powers in their locality. Furthermore, this creates equity problems in public resource allocation between districts. 
The changes introduced have created instability. The aforementioned structural related factors cause consultation, 
supervision and coordination problems or limitations. In practical terms, Districts such as Ennemor and Enner 
are experiencing severe human resources shortages and have challenges to implement the programs. Study 
participants in small sized districts, such as Endegagn, reported that inadequate finances and vehicles shortage 
are factors adversely affecting the effectiveness of local public governance. 
 
7.6. Level of Community Participation and Empowerment 
To examine the level and determinants of community participation in local public decision-making, planning and 
management in the study area, data from a survey of elected and appointed government officials, council 
members, and civil servants were gathered.  The extent of local government bodies’ consultation to the 
community and other governance actors is reported to be a possible weakness to participation. This is partly due 
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to low capacity of local government bodies to listen and heed to ideas and suggestions from ordinary citizens. 
For the community members and local governance actors, inability to express or influence public affairs means 
powerlessness to prevent misuses of public resources. In order to examine the extent of involvement in public 
services process, six indicators were used. Survey participants were asked the extent of their involvement in 
planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and decision making using five Likert Scale 
measurement (very high, high, moderate, low and very low).  
The data show that there is variation in the extent of their involvement in the processes. 
 
 
Figure 4: Actors Participantion on the Process of Local Public Service Production and Provision 
Source: Researcher’s Ph.D. Field Survey, 2013/14 
Decentralization in Ethiopia seems to have changed participation in local governance for production and 
provision of public services. However, survey participants point out that the extent of involvement in planning, 
implementation, monitoring, evaluation and decision-making varies (see Table 7 and Figure 4). The data 
presented in the Table 8 show that the association governance actors’ participation and their involvement in the 
aforementioned processes is statistically significant.  
 
Table7: Indicators of Actors’ Participation in Production and Provision of Decentralized Public Services 
Indicators= 
The Extent of  
Actors         
involvement in 
NP VH H M L VL 
n % n % n % n % n % n % 
planning process 41 15.6 93 35.5 37 14.1 60 22.9 21 8.0 10 3.8 
budgeting process 46 17.6 23 8.8 38 14.5 72 27.5 49 18.7 34 13.0 
plan 
implementation 
38 14.5 104 39.7 41 15.6 56 21.4 16 6.1 7 2.7 
monitoring 42 16.0 61 23.3 44 16.8 73 27.9 26 9.9 16 6.1 
Evaluation 42 16.0 72 27.5 40 15.3 67 25.6 24 9.2 17 6.5 
Decision making 51 19.5 14 5.3 37 14.1 43 16.4 47 17.9 70 26.7 
NP=Not Participate, Very High, H= High, M= Moderate, L= Low, VL= Very Low, n= FrequencySource: 
Researcher’s Field Survey, 2013/14 
 
Table 8: Chi-Square Test results actors’ participation and the extent of their involvement in the process 
 Chi-square df Asymp.sig 
The extent of actors’ involvement in planning  100.748
a 
5 0.000 
The extent of actors’ involvement in budgeting process 31.817
a
 5 0.000 
The extent of actors’ involvement in plan implementation 136.061
a 
5 0.000 
The extent of actors’ involvement monitoring 51.328a 5 0.000 
The extent of actors’ involvement  in evaluation 
The extent of actors’ involvement in decision making 
56.366
a 
 38.550
a 
5 
5 
0.000 
0.000 
0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 43.7. 
Source: Researcher’s Field Survey, 2013/14 
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7.6.1. Involvement in Decision-making 
The study attempts to identify the participants’ perception on involvement in decision-making. The result shows 
that their perception differed from district to district. However, majority of the participants (19.5%) reported that 
they are not involved in decision-making. In addition, detailed analysis of data from the participants rating of the 
extent of their involvement in decision-making declined from very high (5.3%), high (14.1%), moderate (16.4%), 
low (17.9%) to very low (26.9%). 
Increase community participation through the creation of a system of self-governing network with 
consultative powers was the objective of district level decentralization program in Ethiopia. As measurement of 
a contract to local government social accountability mechanism, the government expected to promote a local 
development plan implementation effort that has resulted in a government open system of governance networks 
with the stated goals of increasing participation and improving the local governments’ responsiveness to its 
constituent communities. However, as depicted in the Table 6, the institutional actors’ participation in decision-
making is not promising.   
 
7.6.2. Decentralization and Empowerment Strategies 
Critics of decentralization reform in Africa have argued that one of the limitations of the reform is that it 
empowers local government elites than empowering ordinary citizens (the poor)(Olowu and Wunsch, 2004). 
Such phenomenon misdirects the benefits of the government services provision from vulnerable groups such as 
poor and women to local government official elites. 
The survey participants were asked,” Is it true that decentralization in Ethiopia puts more power in the 
hands of local governments than local communities/citizens?”The results show that significantly large proportion 
of participants (64.3%) perceived that decentralization reform in Ethiopia devolves more power to local 
governments than local communities. While (28.6%) of participants reported that the community empowerment 
is greater compared to local governments. Local community empowerments are required to effect further change. 
However, the perception toward community empowerment is slight different from locality to locality (See Table 
10). 
 
Table10: Participants’ Perception on Empowerments 
SNG*  local community more empowered 
SNG   
 
LG more empowered than citizens Total in % 
Y N IDK 
Guraghe zone Count 15 4 3 22 
% within SNG 68.2% 18.2% 13.6% 100 
wolkite Count 10 4 2 16 
% within SNG 62.5% 25.0% 12.5% 100 
Abesheghe Count 9 5 3 17 
% within SNG 52.9% 29.4% 17.6% 100 
Enmor and Ener Count 24 17 6 47 
% within SNG 51.1% 36.2% 12.8% 100 
Endegagn Count 14 6 0 20 
% within SNG 70.0% 30.0% 0.0% 100 
Geta Count 12 8  20 
% within  SNG 60.0% 40.0% 0.0% 100 
Ezza Count 19 10 1 30 
% within  SNG 63.3% 33.3% 3.3% 100 
Sodo Count 32 2 2 36 
% within SNG 88.9% 5.6% 5.6% 100 
Meskan Count 20 14 2 36 
% within SNG 55.6% 38.9% 5.6% 100 
Total  Count 155 70 19 244 
% within SNG  63.5% 28.7% 7.8% 100 
Note: Y=Yes, N=No, IDK= I Do Not Know, SNG= Name of Subnational Government 
Source: Researcher’s Ph.D. Field Survey, 2013/14 
 
7.7. Conclusion 
Ethiopia decentralized and devolved central government power to local authorities. However, in the process 
local government official elites are more empowered than ordinary citizens at the grassroots level. The results of 
the study revealed that local governments in the study area are controlled and run in the form of regulated self-
governance with Regional State bodies’ decision- making. Political interference was observed and affects self-
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governance.  
Local government population size matters in Guraghe Zone Districts, Ethiopia. In addition, there are large 
discrepancies in local government population size and geographic area. However, the number of appointed local 
government officials, and the structure in public organizations do not account for such variation. The situation is 
exacerbated by the fact that there is no pay difference between officials serving vastly different population sizes.  
This affects the effectiveness of decentralized public governance.        
Even if the Ethiopian DLDP suggests the population size of a district should be between 100,000 and 
120,000 for district government formation, this suggestion is not heeded in practice. The program mandates a 
proper local rural government population size for efficient, effective and responsive public services provision, 
but local elites and their networks with upper level political patrons ignore the standard and follow their own 
comfortable standards.  Thus, a clear institutional arrangement for coordination and management of Zonal, 
Woreda, and Kebel administrations must be designed and implemented by both Federal and Regional State 
governments. This would discourage local elite patrons’ influence and interventions in favor of effective 
decentralized public governance, empowerment, democracy and development. Absent this, the vulnerability of 
the local poor and minority ethnic group will become worse. SNNPRS that have empowered and established 
Zonal, Woreda and Kebel administrations should grant powers to the Zonal and Woreda governments so they 
can establish their self-governance units.  
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